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BOOK REVIEW 
STINGRAY CELL-SITE SIMULATOR 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE  
FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE  
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:  
A REVIEW OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE, AND 
UNWARRANTED  
BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT 
PERMISSION, NEW YORK: FARRAR, STRAUSS AND GIROUX, 2017. 
PP. 434. 
DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF 
SURVEILLANCE, NEW YORK: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2017. 
PP. 305.  
HARVEY GEE† 
INTRODUCTION 
The police can secretly track your every physical movement, 
listen to your private conversations, and collect data from your 
cell phone—all without first getting a warrant based on probable 
cause, signed off by a judge.  “WTF?!” you text.  Indeed, this 
practice by law enforcement using portable Stingray cell-site 
simulators as digital surveillance tools has also raised the 
eyebrows of privacy advocates and state and federal courts across 
the country in the past few years.  
 
† The author is an attorney in San Francisco. He previously served as an 
attorney with the Office of the Federal Public Defender in Las Vegas and Pittsburgh, 
the Federal Defenders of the Middle District of Georgia, and the Office of the 
Colorado State Public Defender. LL.M., The George Washington University Law 
School; J.D., St. Mary’s School of Law; B.A., Sonoma State University. The author 
thanks Jacqueline Mancini, Anthony Nania, David Saldamando, Olivia Walseth, 
Jamie Zeevi, and the St. John's Law Review for invaluable feedback and assistance 
in the preparation of this Review. 
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Stingrays, sometimes also referred to as Triggerfish, IMSI 
Catchers, and Digital Analyzers, are the military grade cell-site 
simulators used by federal and local law enforcement to 
electronically track individuals suspected of criminal activity or 
to conduct mass surveillance on groups of unsuspecting people or 
particular areas.1  Stingrays, which were originally developed for 
military and intelligence agencies for use overseas, act as phony 
cell phone towers by sending powerful electronic signals to all cell 
phones within their range to trigger an automatic response from 
nearby phones.2  Truly, Stingrays epitomize how new 
technologies are transforming the experience, regulation, and 
definition of personal privacy today.  Lacking guidance on this 
issue, courts must choose to apply, adapt, or reject settled 
doctrinal rules, and interpret recent United States Supreme 
Court decisions, in deciding whether the use of Stingrays violates 
the Fourth Amendment.  Because Fourth Amendment 
surveillance cases tend to crawl along the appellate process at a 
snail’s pace, it will likely take years for this issue to reach the 
Supreme Court.  In the meantime, lower courts are left wrestling 
with the constitutionality of cell-simulator use, and legislatures 
continue to debate about their efficacy. 
This Review discusses two timely and insightful books 
examining the changing relationship between privacy and the 
Fourth Amendment in the digital era.  Part I discusses the 
tensions between the need to protect privacy rights and the 
slowly evolving legal landscape during a time of rapidly changing 
technology, to introduce David Gray’s The Fourth Amendment in 
an Age of Surveillance.3  His book explains how the Fourth 
Amendment, though embattled, can have a prominent role in 
 
1 See Alicia Lu, What is StingRay, The Creepy Device Chicago Police: “Used to 
Spy” On Eric Garner Protesters?, BUSTLE (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.bustle.com/ 
articles/53050-what-is-stingray-the-creepy-device-chicago-police-used-to-spy-on-eric-
garner-protesters. 
2 See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More Than a Pen 
Register and Less Than a Wire Tap: What the StingRay Teaches Us About How 
Congress Should Approach the Reform of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 134, 147–48 (2013) (claiming “the unmediated nature of 
StingRay technology makes it essentially ‘invisible’ in operation and leaves behind 
no retrievable trace that is subject to future detection” and that “the StingRay, 
masquerading as the cell site with the strongest signal, receives the information 
immediately and directly as it is communicated by the mobile phones, leaving no 
trace of interception with the third party provider”). 
3 DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (2017). 
Gray is a Professor of Law at the University of Maryland, Francis King Carey School 
of Law. 
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twenty-first century discussions of privacy, technology, and 
surveillance.4  Gray’s analysis is engaged to broaden the 
conversation about Stingray technology.  This section analyzes a 
sampling of the litigation over Stingrays and highlights the 
divergent, sometimes vibrant, opinions held by courts about the 
viability of Katz v. United States5 in current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
Part II analyzes two important Stingray surveillance cases, 
State v. Andrews6 and United States v. Patrick,7 speculating 
further about a future Supreme Court case where a majority 
looks disfavorably upon law enforcement’s use of Stingray 
surveillance technology.  Part III shifts to discuss Barry 
Friedman’s book, Unwarranted: Policing Without Permission,8 to 
explore why better police accountability is needed in a modern 
world.  Citizens want both safe neighborhoods and less police 
misconduct at a time when the police are conducting searches 
with neither warrants nor probable cause.9  Unwarranted is a 
critical dissection of the debates about policing, and a clarion call 
to take responsibility.  At the core, Friedman argues that 
limitations must be placed on the unfettered discretion afforded 
to the police when they conduct traffic stops and stop and frisks 
as well as when they use surveillance technology.  
Part IV builds upon the background established by the Age 
of Surveillance and Unwarranted to present an argument that 
curbing police authority to arbitrarily stop individuals is now 
more difficult in light of Utah v. Strieff,10 a wrongly decided 
decision dealing a serious blow to the exclusionary rule.  
Part V discusses the unfettered discretion exercised by the 
Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia 
(“MPD”) when embarking on indiscriminate searches using 
 
4 Gray’s book is divided into six sections, touching on the age of surveillance, the 
Fourth Amendment, and competing proposals and Fourth Amendment remedies. 
5 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
6 134 A.3d 324 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).  
7 842 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2016). 
8 BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION (2017). 
Friedman is a Professor of Law at New York University School of Law.  
9 Friedman’s book is divided into three parts covering democratic policing, 
constitutional policing, and twenty-first century policing. Democratic policing 
addresses the police working in secret and an ineffective legislature and court. 
Constitutional policing analyzes the police conducting searches without warrants 
and probable cause, and discriminatory searches. Twenty-first century policing 
explores surveillance technology, counterterrorism, and national security. 
10 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).  
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Veritrax GPS records to look for potential suspects who may be 
on supervised probation.  This issue has received scant attention 
because the increase in the number of people on community 
supervision, or “mass supervision,” through probation and parole 
is largely an afterthought. 
I. THE JONES CASE AND THE STINGRAY SURVEILLANCE DEBATE 
“[Stingrays] haven’t contributed anything meaningful to 
counterterrorism efforts.  Instead, they have largely served as 
police surveillance and information sharing nodes for law 
enforcement efforts targeting the frequent subjects of  
police attention:  Black and brown people, immigrants, 
dissidents, and the poor.”11 
Jones v. United States illustrates the delicate balancing of 
privacy rights with the need for police to investigate a crime.12  In 
a 2017 case of first impression in Washington, D.C. challenging 
the warrantless use of cell-site simulator technology, Jones was 
convicted of robbing and raping two women.13  Jones stole a cell 
phone from one of the women.14  The MPD, without first getting a 
warrant, relied on a Stingray to track down the phone’s 
location.15  The cell-site simulator led the police to a row of cars 
parked near the Minnesota Avenue Metro Station where they 
found and arrested Jones.16  Jones was convicted of various 
offenses “arising out of two alleged incidents of sexual assault 
and robbery at knifepoint.”17   
The MPD argued that a warrant was not necessary because 
there were exigent circumstances present.18  The District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that the MPD’s use of Stingray 
 
11 Mike Maharrey, Oregon Bill Would Ban Warrantless Stingray Spying, Help 
Hinder Federal Surveillance, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2019/01/oregon-bill-would-ban-warrantless-
stingray-spying-help-hinder-federal-surveillance/ (quoting Nasser Eledroos, Oops– 
Did Police Accidentically Reveal Unconstitutional Surveillance When They Tweeted a 
Screenshot? AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 11, 2018, 6:30 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/rights-protesters/oops-did-police-accidentally-
reveal-unconstitutional-surveillance). 
12 168 A.3d 703 (D.C. 2017). 
13 Id. at 707–08. 
14 Id. at 708. 
15 Id. at 707–09.  
16 Id. at 708–09. 
17 Id. at 707. 
18 Id. at 710–11. 
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technology violated Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights.19  Judge 
Beckwith, writing for the panel majority, determined that it was 
unconstitutional for the government to use a Stingray to find 
Jones before first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.20  
Beckwith was especially concerned with the actively deceptive 
nature of the Stingray and the lack of applicable law on these 
devices.21 
Judge Thompson argued in his dissenting opinion that 
society is not prepared to recognize an expectation of privacy in a 
phone’s location, and thus Jones, “traveling on the public roads 
with a powered-on, stolen cell phone,” could not have held a 
reasonable expectation that the location of the cell phone would 
be private.22  In an aside, Thompson drew a distinction between 
cell phone owners’ two-fold privacy expectations: people expect 
privacy in the actual contents saved in their cell phones, yet 
victims of cell phone theft would be willing to give up their 
expectation of privacy if a Stingray is used to track down their 
stolen phone.23 
These opposing opinions about the extent of Fourth 
Amendment protection between the two Washington, D.C. jurists 
sets the stage for Gray’s commentary in Age of Surveillance 
about big data information gathering, including the prevalence of 
cell-site simulators and their surveillance of almost all cell 
phones.  Gray’s commentary uncovers the original meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment to reveal its historical guarantees of 
collective security against threats of “unreasonable searches and 
seizures,” and it ends with concrete solutions to the current 
Fourth Amendment crisis. 
At the outset, indiscriminate big data information gathering 
by the government is prevalent.  By definition, big data are 
“technologies and programs that aggregate, store, and analyze” 
varied source material.24  Big data programs have access to 
information sources including credit histories, criminal records, 
property ownership, consumer transactions, and other personal 
 
19 Id. at 707. 
20 Id. The court ruled on the issue of whether the use of a cell-site simulator 
constituted a search, even though the trial court declined to do so; the trial court 
focused instead on the issues of standing, exigent circumstances, and inevitable 
discovery. Id. at 710.  
21 Id. at 720. 
22 Id. at 735–36 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
23 Id. at 730, 737–38.  
24 GRAY, supra note 3, at 38. 
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information.25  Big data’s collection methodology “leverages 
modern information gathering, aggregation, storage, and 
analysis technologies.”26  Big data affects the abilities of subjects 
to control access to often personal and sensitive information, 
impacts freedom of movement—no fly lists, global-positioning-
system tracking of probationers—and affects the “ability of 
people to get jobs, secure housing, and access credit.”27   
While “these kinds of restraints on freedom fall short of 
traditional full custodial arrests,” Gray says they still are 
“seizures” because “they place persons in the grasps of state 
power.”28  He further asserts that the government’s “unfettered 
discretion to deploy and use big data programs threatens the 
Fourth Amendment rights of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, or effects against unreasonable search 
or seizure.”29  Through this lens, Gray considers Stingrays as the 
most notorious of the broad tracking technologies exploiting 
personal electronic devices.30  Cell-site simulators engage in 
invasive searches when they indiscriminately monitor 
communication devices.31  The deployment of Stingrays has 
become commonplace, and they are most prevalent in urban 
areas and “high crime” neighborhoods.32 
The benign appearance of Stingrays disguises their invidious 
nature.  Stingrays resemble large metallic radio transmitters, are 
the size of suitcases, and can be carried by hand, placed in a car, 
or mounted on a drone or airplane.33  Stingrays capture text, 
numbers of outgoing calls, emails, serial numbers, identification 
information, GPS locations, actual contents of conversations, and 
other raw and detailed information from unsuspecting phones 
and they can track the locations of targets and non-targets in 
 
25 Id. at 41. 
26 Id. at 263. 
27 Id. at 264. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 263–75. 
30 Id. at 4, 33–34, 261–63. 
31 Id. at 261–62. 
32 Id. at 4–5. 
33 See id. at 33–34; Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret 
StingRay’s No Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell 
Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14–15 (2014); Lisa Bartley, Investigation: Law Enforcement 
Use Secret ‘Stingray’ Devices to Track Cell Phone Signals, ABC7 EYEWITNESS NEWS 
(Dec. 3, 2014), https://abc7.com/news/investigation-law-enforcement-use-secret-
devices-to-track-cell-phone-signals/421190/.  
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apartments, cars, buses, and on streets.34  They can even make 
the tracked device send text messages and make calls.35  The 
collateral consequences resulting from their use includes the 
disruption of cell service to phones in the form of service outages, 
blocked and dropped calls, and the complete draining of a cell 
phone’s battery.36   
To be fair, there are legitimate uses of Stingrays.  Stingrays 
have proven to be useful in tracking down dangerous fugitives on 
crime sprees, including the suspect responsible for four Texas 
bombings last year.37  They are invaluable tools for intelligence 
gathering in terrorism cases when there is an immediate threat 
to human life and for other emergency situations.  More often 
than not though, Stingrays are not being used for investigations 
of serious crimes like murders, kidnappings, rapes, shootings, 
aggravated assaults with serious injuries, capturing fugitives, 
and robberies.38  On the contrary, Stingrays are used in run of 
the mill matters such as locating stolen cell phones or scanning 
from the skies over amusement parks and along the border.39 
 
34 GRAY, supra note 3, at 34–35, 38. 
35 See, e.g., Jeremy H. D’Amico, Cellphones, Stingrays, and Searches! An Inquiry 
into the Legality of Cellular Location Information, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1252, 1296 
(2016) (noting that these devices can “intercept” calls and text messages); Andrew 
Hemmer, Duty of Candor in the Digital Age: The Need For Heightened Judicial 
Supervision of Stingray Searches, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 295, 296 (2016) (describing 
the tracking abilities of Stingrays and how they can “hijack[]” a phone to perform 
calls and texts disguised as the targeted phones); Austin McCullough, StingRay 
Searches and the Fourth Amendment Implications of Modern Cellular Surveillance, 
53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 41, 41–42 (2016) (same); Pell & Soghoian, supra note 
33, at 14. 
36 See Brian Barrett, The Baltimore PD’s Race Bias Extends to High-Tech 
Spying, Too, WIRED (Aug. 16, 2016, 8:01 AM), http://www.wired.com/2016/08/ 
baltimore-pds-race-bias-extends-high-tech-spying; Colin Daileda, The Police 
Technology Intensifying Racial Discrimination, MASHABLE (Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://mashable-com-cdn.ampproject.org/v/s/mashable.com/2016/10/03/police-
technology-surveillance-racial-bias.amp. 
37 See Inside The “Fatal Mistake” That Led Police to the Austin Parcel Bombing 
Suspect, ABC NEWS (last updated Mar. 21, 2018, 10:38 PM), https://www.abc. 
net.au/news/2018-03-22/how-a-phone-steered-the-hunt-for-texas-parcel-
bomber/9576040.  
38 See Marlan Hetherly, Judge Rules Surveillance Info Collected by Police 
Stingrays Can Remain Confidential, WBFO (Apr. 12, 2018), http://news.wbfo.org/ 
post/judge-rules-surveillance-info-collected-police-stingrays-can-remain-confidential.  
39 See Ashley Carman, Cops in Disneyland’s Homeland Used Stingray 
Surveillance Devices, VERGE (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/ 
1/28/10859596/california-anaheim-disneyland-police-stingray-spy (describing 
Anaheim Police Department’s use of Stingrays and “dirtbox” surveillance devices 
within range of sixteen million Disneyland visitors); George Joseph, Racial 
Disparities in Police “Stingray” Surveillance, Mapped, CITYLAB (Oct. 18, 2016), 
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Absent any specified protocol about their Stingray use or 
judicial oversight, law enforcement freely relies on Stingrays to 
either target and track particular individual protests or to mass 
collect phone numbers in high crime areas.40  Such threats to 
individual privacy are arguably the equivalent of the intrusive 
and indiscriminate searches that the Fourth Amendment was 
intended to prevent.  In spite of these concerns, the questionable 
use of Stingrays has become routine.  The Baltimore Police 
Department, the heaviest user of Stingrays in the country, 
deployed Stingrays thousands of times in low-income African 
American sections of the city in ninety percent of Stingray 
incidents mapped during the riots following the death of Freddie 
Gray at the hands of the Baltimore police, and during Black 
Lives Matter demonstrations.41  Known Stingray operations in 
Milwaukee and Tallahassee are also heavily concentrated in 
non-white, poor communities.42  
Unfortunately, an accurate and complete evaluation of the 
efficacy of Stingray programs cannot be achieved due to the lack 
of transparency about their purchase and use.  Aware of this, 
judges and elected officials are pushing back more and more 
against their unfettered use and the often cloak-and-dagger 
shenanigans that come along with that.43  For instance, when law 
 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/10/racial-disparities-in-police-stingray-
sureveillance-mapped/502715/; Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?,  
ACLU (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-
technologies/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them (identifying Customs and 
Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement as known federal 
agencies using Stingrays). 
40 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High Crime Area” 
Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment 
Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1590–92 (2008) (analyzing 
and critiquing reviewing courts’ consideration of an area as a “high crime area” as 
an evaluation factor determining reasonableness of Fourth Amendment stops); Kate 
Klonick, Stingrays: Not Just for Feds! How Local Law Enforcement Uses an Invasive, 
Unreliable Surveillance Tool, SLATE (Nov. 10, 2014, 9:52 AM), http://www.slate. 
com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/11/stingrays_imsi_catchers_how_local_la
w-enforcement_uses_an_invasive_surveillance.html. 
41 See Barrett, supra note 36; Daileda, supra note 36; Joseph, supra note 39; 
Andy Martino, Black Lives Matter Activists are Convinced the NYPD Hacked Their 
Phones, THE OUTLINE (Apr. 7, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://theoutline.com/post/1360/ 
black-lives-matter-police-surveillance-the-cops-hacked-their-phones?. 
42 See Joseph, supra note 39.  
43 See Hemmer, supra note 35, at 300–01 (calling for heightened judicial review 
of Stingray searches which infringe upon civil liberties); Tom Jackman, D.C. Appeals 
Court Poised To Rule on Whether Police Need Warrants for Cellphone Tracking, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/ 
2017/04/18/d-c-appeals-court-poised-to-rule-on-whether-police-need-warrants-for-
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enforcement officers submit applications for search warrants, 
they often disingenuously leave out any references to the use of 
cell-site simulators.44  When questioned, agencies using Stingrays 
are quick to halfheartedly explain that “public revelation of their 
technological capabilities threaten to compromise the efficacy of 
surveillance.”45  Sometimes when backed into a corner, agencies 
will just drop their prosecution rather than spill the beans about 
the Stingray and risk a breach of the manufacturer’s mandatory 
non-disclosure agreement.46  Gray responds by advocating for 
statutory regulations for cell-site simulators, along with a 
warrant requirement as a counterbalance to the unfettered 
discretion of law enforcement:   
In light of the surveillance capacities of cell site simulators, 
their widespread use, the paucity of statutory regulations, and 
the utter absence of constitutional limitations, . . . [i]t is hard to 
imagine a better example of conditions characteristic of a 
surveillance state or a means and method of government 
surveillance more in need of Fourth Amendment regulation.47 
Essentially, Gray wants cell-site simulator regulations that 
are akin to the Wiretap Act.48  Friedman similarly argues for 
transparency over the use of Stingrays because they act as 
wiretaps.49  Both are correct.  At a minimum, the government 
should be required to satisfy the exacting procedural 
 
cellphone-tracking (reporting the secret use of cell-site simulators by police and 
federal agents over the years); Spencer S. Hsu, In District, Warrantless Tracking 
Requests Surge in Past 3 Years, WASH. POST, (July 19, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/court-warrantless-requests-to-
track-cellphones-internet-use-grew-sevenfold-in-dc-in-three-
years/2017/07/18/b284ac32-6b36-11e7-9c15-177740635e83_story.html. 
44 See GRAY, supra note 3, at 36; see, e.g., Hemmer, supra note 35, at 297 (noting 
that in one case, “the government failed to specify the technology that it intended to 
use in executing the search warrant, leaving out crucial details related to the 
device’s invasiveness and likely impact on third parties”). 
45 THE CATO INSTITUTE, STINGRAY: A NEW FRONTIER IN POLICE SURVEILLANCE 
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-809-revised.pdf. 
46 See GRAY, supra note 3, at 36 (2017) (“In cases where defendants have 
nevertheless discovered what is afoot, local prosecutors have gone so far as to drop 
criminal charges in order to avoid exposing the use of cell site simulators to judicial 
review.”); Howard W. Cox, StingRay Technology and Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy in the Internet of Everything, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 29, 31–32 (2016) 
(reporting that “Baltimore officials agreed to seek dismissal of . . . charges” rather 
than “compromis[ing] the technology” by allowing its use to be revealed in court); 
Joseph, supra note 39. 
47 GRAY, supra note 3, at 38.  
48 See id. at 262–63.  
49 FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 32.  
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requirements of the Wiretap Act before any Stingray use is 
authorized.  Pursuant to the Federal Wire Tap Act, before a 
wiretap can be issued, a judge must find that “there is probable 
cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, 
or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in 
section 2516 of this chapter.”50  The government must also show 
that the wiretap is necessary and that the goal of the 
investigation could not be achieved through normal investigative 
techniques.51 
Here, Friedman is most persuasive in insisting that 
warrants based on probable cause be required of the government 
when applying for court orders.52  The focus of Fourth 
Amendment analysis, Friedman says, should be shifted from the 
perspective of whether surveillance technologies threaten a 
reasonable expectation of privacy to law enforcements’ unfettered 
use of Stingrays, which threatens the right of the people to be 
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.53  Gray is in 
agreement, and insists that “[g]ranting this kind of unfettered 
discretion would pose the same kinds of general threats to the 
security of the people against unreasonable searches posed by 
general warrants and writs of assistance.”54  
Gray and Friedman are not outliers on this issue.  There is 
growing, vocal, grass-roots opposition against Stingray 
surveillance by public defenders and privacy activists demanding 
more transparency of police surveillance, and that the public be 
allowed to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding 
how Stingrays are used.55  Many observers have called for  
 
 
 
 
50 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (U.S.C. 2012). 
51 See id. at § 2518(3)(c). 
52 FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 137. 
53 See id. at 258; see also Amir Nasr, Poll: Little Trust That Tech Giants Will 
Keep Personal Data Private, MORNINGCONSULT (Apr. 10, 2017), https://morning 
consult.com/2017/04/10/poll-little-trust-tech-giants-will-keep-personal-data-private 
(discussing polls reflecting the skepticism held by Americans about the ability of 
internet service providers to keep their personal data private); Lee Rainie, 
Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era of Privacy Concerns, 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-social-media-in-an-era-of-
privacy-concerns/ (same with regards to social media providers).  
54 GRAY, supra note 3, at 262. 
55 See Joseph, supra note 39. 
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transparency of Stingray policies after the Justice Department’s 
2015 decision requiring federal investigators to obtain a search 
warrant from a judge to use the device.56   
Outside the beltway, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin 
have passed laws that protect citizens’ cell phone data, requiring 
police to get a warrant to use a Stingray.57  The Oregon Senate is 
considering a proposed law that blocks the warrantless use of 
Stingrays to protect privacy rights.58  Likewise, the Texas 
legislature is considering a warrant requirement for Stingrays, 
except in emergency situations.59  New York and other states are 
 
56 See Cox, supra note 46, at 35 (calling for Congress to draft legislation creating 
a new statutory right in privacy and limiting government’s access to this data); 
Robert Snell, Feds Use Anti-Terror Tool to Hunt the Undocumented, DETROIT NEWS 
(May 18, 2018), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2017/05/ 
18/cell-snooping-fbi-immigrant/101859616/. Indeed, Congress should update and 
create privacy laws to address law enforcement’s use of these advanced surveillance 
techniques. See Editorial Board, Congress Must Reckon with the Fourth Amendment 
and New Technology, WASH. POST (June 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/opinions/congress-must-reckon-with-the-fourth-amendment-and-new-
technology/2018/06/23/f95578c0-7653-11e8-9780-b1dd6a09b549_story.html (opining 
that after Carpenter, Congress should step in to craft rules that clarify standards to 
accommodate new technology). 
57 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 46, at 31 (discussing the reaction by various state 
legislatures to the use of Stingrays and remarking, “[T]welve states have passed 
laws requiring law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator must be based upon a 
court issued search warrant based upon probable cause”); Katherine M. Sullivan, Is 
Your Smartphone Conversation Private? The Stingray Device’s Impact on Privacy in 
Statutes, CATH. U. L. REV. 388, 400 (2018) (arguing for more state legislation to 
protect privacy of citizens); Klonick, supra note 40; Mike Maharrey, Arizona 
Committee Passes Bill to Prohibit Warrantless Stingray Spying, TENTH AMENDMENT 
CENTER (Feb. 7, 2017), https://fromthetrenchesworldreport.com/arizona-committee-
passes-bill-prohibit-warrantless-stingray-spying/182520; Mike Maharrey, Missouri 
Committee Passes Bill to Ban Warrantless Stingray Spying, Help Hinder Federal 
Surveillance, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (Feb. 21, 2018), https://blog.tenth 
amendmentcenter.com/2018/02/missouri-committee-passes-bill-to-ban-warrantless-
stingray-spying-hinder-federal-surveillance/; Mike Maharrey, Florida Committee 
Passes Bill to Ban Warrantless Stingray Spying, Help Hinder Federal Surveillance, 
TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (Feb. 7, 2018), https://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/ 
2019/02/florida-committee-passes-bill-to-ban-warrantless-stingray-spying-help-
hinder-federal-surveillance-2/; Snell, supra note 56 (offering that states can adopt 
laws requiring judicial authorization before local law enforcement is allowed to use 
Stingrays, adopt laws limiting how long they can retain the data, and reserving the 
use of Stingrays only for cases implicating violence or harm to human life). 
58 Maharrey, supra note 11. 
59 See Anna M. Tinsley, Texas Lawmakers’ Bills Would Limit Cellphone 
Trackers, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Apr. 18, 2015), https://www.star-telegram. 
com/news/politics-government/article18868620.html. 
336 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:325 
developing similar legislation.60  On the local level, Berkeley, 
Oakland, Santa Clara County, Nashville, Seattle, Somerville, 
and Davis have already adopted strong laws governing the police 
acquisition and use of surveillance technologies.61  All told, these 
legislative measures are only the first steps in regulating 
Stingrays.  As discussed below, legislation means nothing unless 
it has teeth and bite.  Moreover, it must pass judicial muster and 
contain a warrant requirement.   
II. ARGUING ABOUT STINGRAYS: MORE JUDGES DISAGREE ABOUT 
THE LEGALITY OF CELL-SITE SIMULATORS 
This section looks at two important stingray surveillance 
cases that were precursors to Jones v. United States.  Some 
Maryland jurists are disdainful about the use of Stingrays, while 
some Chicago judges conclude that Stingrays are not invasive.   
A. Lower Courts Wrestle Onward About the Constitutionality of 
Stingray Surveillance  
In State v. Andrews, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
ruled in 2016 on whether the government may transform a cell 
phone into a real-time tracking device without a warrant, and 
the court held that the Baltimore Police Department’s use of 
Hailstorm—an upgraded version of the Stingray—required a 
valid search warrant based on probable cause.62  The appellate 
court was the first state appellate court to order evidence 
obtained using a Stingray to be suppressed.63  As with most 
cell-site location information (“CSLI”) cases, the government 
relied on the third-party doctrine established by United States v. 
Miller, which concerned bank records,64 and Smith v. Maryland, 
 
60 Martino, supra note 41. 
61 See Robyn Greene, How Cities Are Reining in Out-of-Control Policing Tech, 
SLATE (May 14, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/05/oakland-california-and-
other-cities-are-reining-in-out-of-control-police-technologies.html; DJ Pangburn, 
Berkeley Mayor: We Passed the “Strongest” Police Surveillance Law, FAST COMPANY 
(Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40558647/berkeley-mayor-we-passed-
the-strongest-police-surveillance-law. 
62 State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 350 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016). 
63 See Cyrus Farivar, For the First Time, Federal Judge Tosses Evidence 
Obtained Via Stingray, ARS TECHNICA (July 12, 2016, 9:07 PM), https://arstechnica. 
com/tech-policy/2016/07/for-the-first-time-federal-judge-tosses-evidence-obtained-via-
stingray/. 
64 425 U.S. 435, 438–40 (1976). In Miller, federal agents presented subpoenas to 
two banks to produce financial records of the defendant. Id. at 437. The Court held 
that the Fourth Amendment was not violated because there was no reasonable 
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which concerned pen registers.65  Under the third-party doctrine, 
when information is “voluntarily” given to third parties, an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
information, making the Fourth Amendment inapplicable.66 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that the 
government violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights 
by using the Hailstorm to locate him.  The court viewed the 
State’s actions in protecting the Hailstorm technology with the 
use of an non-disclosure agreement as contrary to constitutional 
principles.67  Of particular concern to the court was the potential 
for unchecked use of the Hailstorm to track a cell phone’s 
movement across both public and private spaces to learn about 
the private and personal habits of any user.68  The court 
concluded that (1) Andrews did not “assume the risk” that the 
information obtained through the use of the Hailstorm device 
would be shared by the service provider and that (2) the 
third-party doctrine did not apply since his location data was 
never transmitted to a third-party—such as a cell-service 
provider—voluntarily by Andrews.69   
That same year, the the Seventh Circuit sided with the 
government’s use of Stingrays in United States v. Patrick,70 which 
was the first time that a federal court substantively discussed 
the warrantless use of a Stingray.  Wisconsin police arrested 
Damian Patrick while he was in a car on a public street and in 
unlawful possession of a gun.71  Patrick, a state prison parolee, 
had a warrant issued for his arrest for noncompliance with the 
conditions of his release.72  Milwaukee police found Patrick with  
 
 
 
 
expectation of privacy in financial records voluntarily conveyed to and regularly 
maintained in the ordinary course of business by a bank, such as financial 
statements and deposit slips. Id. at 442–43.  
65 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). In Smith, police officers were attempting to track 
down a robber who had begun making obscene and harassing phone calls. Id. at 737. 
The Court concluded that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in pen 
registers. Id. at 745–46. 
66 See Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 350–51 (2016). 
67 See id. at 338. 
68 Id. at 348.  
69 Id. at 398–99. 
70 842 F.3d 540 (2016). 
71 Id. at 541. 
72 Id. at 542.  
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the use of cell phone data that was authorized by a second 
warrant.73  Patrick’s location had been pinned down using data 
from a Stingray.74 
After the state conceded that the use of a cell-site simulator 
was a search, Patrick argued that the location-tracking warrant 
was invalid because police were required to obtain a warrant, 
and that police should have revealed to the state judge who 
issued the location-tracking warrant about the Stingray.75  In 
affirming Patrick’s conviction, the panel majority punted on the 
substantive questions about whether a warrant is required to use 
the Stingray and whether a cell-site simulator is a reasonable 
means of executing a warrant.76  The panel narrowly ruled that 
Patrick did not have any privacy interest in a public place and 
reasoned that regardless of the Stingray, Patrick was taken into 
custody based on probable cause and an arrest warrant.77  In 
making that determination, the panel majority paid deference to 
law enforcement’s assurances that Stingrays are not invasive, 
merely relying on the Department of Justice Policy Guidance 
manual’s boilerplate disclaimer that cell-site simulators do not 
function as a GPS locator, do not capture emails, texts, contact 
lists, images, or other phone data, and do not provide subscriber 
account information.78  The panel mischaracterized the prowess 
of Stingrays when it suggested that Stingrays only provide the 
same kind of information that can be obtained from a phone 
company.79   
The majority panel’s glossing over the dangers of Stingray 
surveillance seemingly raised the ire of dissenting Chief Judge 
Dianne Wood, who argued that the panel underestimated the 
Stingray’s capabilities.80  She was especially critical of: (1) the 
government’s unwillingness to be forthcoming with information 
about how the Stingray was used; (2) its concealing the use of the 
Stingray when seeking the warrant; and (3) the majority panel’s 
“blind reliance” on the Department of Justice manual assumption 
that the Milwaukee police followed proper procedures.81   
 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 543–44. 
76 Id. at 545. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 543. 
79 Id. at 543–44.  
80 See id. at 545 (Wood, J., dissenting).  
81 Id. at 546–47. 
2019] BOOK REVIEW 339 
In light of these serious concerns, Chief Judge Wood wanted 
to remand the case for further fact finding concerning the 
Wisconsin police’s reliance on the Stingray and the authorization 
for searching Patrick’s cell phone:  
It is time for the Stingray to come out of the shadows, so that its 
use can be subject to the same kind of scrutiny as other 
mechanisms, such as thermal imaging devices, GPS trackers, 
pen registers, beepers, and the like.  Its capabilities go far 
beyond any of those, and cases such as Riley indicate that the 
Supreme Court might take a dim view of indiscriminate use of 
something that can read texts and emails, listen to 
conversations, and perhaps intercept other application data 
housed not just on the target’s phone, but also those of countless 
innocent third parties.82  
B. Reasons Why the Supreme Court Would Require a Warrant 
for the Use of Stingray Surveillance Technology 
This subsection expands on Chief Judge Wood’s advisement 
that a future Court case may look disfavorably upon law 
enforcement’s use of Stingray surveillance technology.  Relying 
on the pathways paved in prior key government surveillance 
rulings for direction—Kyllo v. United States,83 United States v. 
Jones,84 Riley v. California,85 and Carpenter v. United States86—I 
predict that a majority will hold that law enforcement’s use of 
cell-site simulators is subject to the Fourth Amendment, and a 
warrant is required for their use.   
A brief survey of the Court’s important surveillance cases of 
the past two decades supports this belief.  In the 2001 decision 
Kyllo v. United States,87 the Court held that the use of a thermal 
imaging device, aimed at a private home from a public street to 
detect relative amounts of heat and obtain information about the 
interior of a home, constitutes a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.88  In 2012, in United States v. Jones,89 a unanimous 
 
82 Id. at 552. 
83 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
84 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
85 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
86 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
87 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
88 See also Andrew G. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First 
Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
125, 133 (2002) (“The Supreme Court has generally failed to see any enhanced 
dangers to privacy caused by rapidly changing police surveillance 
technologies. . . . [T]he Court has addressed technology questions under the same 
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Court expressed discomfort with the government’s attachment of 
a GPS tracker on a jeep for twenty-eight days, which was 
determined to be a “search.”90  In the 2014 consolidated case 
Riley v. California,91 the Court addressed whether an officer’s 
search of a defendant’s “smart phone” incident to an arrest 
violated the Fourth Amendment, and the Court ruled 
unanimously that police generally must obtain a warrant to 
search the contents of cell phones.92  While each case involved 
distinct technology and different facts, their collective rationale 
fit together. 
Then, Carpenter v. United States brought Katz v. United 
States93 into the digital era by holding for the first time that a 
person has an expectation of privacy in the whole of his or her 
physical movement, and that law enforcement agencies generally 
need a warrant to track suspects’ locations using CSLI.94  Chief 
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan, ruled that cell phone users possess a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the CSLI history associated with their 
cell phones.95  Accessing a person’s historical cell-site records, or 
at least seven days or more of cell-site records, is a Fourth 
 
analytical framework that it uses for resolving all Fourth Amendment search 
questions.”). 
89 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
90 Id. at 406. Justice Scalia sidestepped the issue of applying Katz and instead 
used common law trespass theory to conclude that the Government “trespassorily” 
inserted the information gathering device when it encroached on Jones’s jeep—a 
protected area. Id. at 409, 411–12. 
91 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
92 Id. at 403. The majority recognized the privacy interests in the kinds of vast 
data stored in modern cell phones that are so persuasive today. Id. Cell phones 
contain information about internet searches and browsing history and can reveal 
enough personal information and private interests, in the aggregate, to reconstruct a 
person’s private life. Id. at 395–96. Cell phones are miniature computers that 
function as “cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, 
diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers” and possess great storage 
capacity, including the ability to record data even before their purchase date. Id. at 
393–94. A cell phone’s capacity also allows an individual’s private life to be pieced 
together through dated and detailed photos, which can be reconstructed through a 
thousand photographs labeled with details. Id. at 394.  
93 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–53 (1967). Fifty-year-old Katz 
superseded the prior Court rulings that defined “search” and “seizure” only in 
physical terms. Under the Katz two prong expectation of privacy test, a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment takes place when the defendant 
manifests an actual expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as 
legitimate, justifiable, or reasonable. See id. at 353.  
94 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). 
95 Id. at 2217–18. 
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Amendment search because it violates the person’s “legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the records of his physical 
movements.”96  The Carpenter majority boldly rejected the 
government’s arguments that people lose their privacy rights 
when using these technologies.  In doing so, the majority 
reframed the third-party doctrine by limiting and departing from 
a tradition of deference paid to the doctrine and declined to 
extend it to cover CSLI.97 
Importantly, Chief Justice Roberts raised concerns in dicta 
about the current and future potential for abuse if the 
government is able to collect a week or more of a person’s data 
without having to show probable cause.98  He pointed out that 
tracking historical cell-site records is much worse than GPS 
monitoring and more invasive.99  Chief Justice Roberts’s 
reasoning can be readily applied to Stingrays, which can identify 
a person’s location within six feet, whereas CSLI location 
information only identifies a person’s location within about a  
 
 
 
96 Id. at 2217. 
97 Id.; see Orin Kerr, Understanding the Supreme Court’s Carpenter Decision, 
LAW FARE BLOG (June 22, 2018), http://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-
supreme-courts-carpenter-decision. The Fourth Amendment safeguards should 
apply whenever citizens convey personal information to a third party under the 
promise of confidentiality; indeed the courts should “restore the Fourth Amendment 
to its intended position as a mechanism for preserving those spaces in the face of 
unprecedented technological, social, and political pressures.” STEPHEN J. 
SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 143 (2012). The Government argues that the doctrine 
facilitates its ability to obtain information in criminal and terrorism investigations 
via subpoenas, which unlike warrants, do not require a showing of probable cause. 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 241. The government only needs to provide “specific and 
articulable facts” to a court, showing the information is potentially “relevant and 
material” to the criminal investigation. Id. at 245. Friedman suggests that law 
enforcement should be required to demonstrate how its investigation would be 
severely hampered before it is granted access to this private information held by 
third parties. Id. at 257. This can be facilitated by transparent rules governing the 
police’s use of new technology, created after public discussion and debate. Id. at 326.  
98 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221–22; see also Mark Joseph Stern, Sotomayor, 
Fourth Amendment Visionary: How the Supreme Court Vindicated the Justice’s 
Prescient Theory of Digital Privacy, SLATE (June 24, 2018), http://slate.com/news-
and-politics/2018/06/in-carpenter-v-united-states-the-supreme-court-vindicates-
justice-sonia-sotomayors-theory-of-digital-privacy.html (discussing Chief Justice 
Roberts’s reliance in Carpenter on Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones as 
reflected in his repeated citations to her concurrence). 
99 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
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half-mile.100  As Professor Susan Freiwald and former federal 
magistrate judge Stephen W. Smith recently wrote in the 
Harvard Law Review: 
The case for Fourth Amendment protection of cell site simulator 
location data would seem even stronger than in Carpenter.  The 
data gathered by the cell site simulator is generated by law 
enforcement, not the provider, and so the third party doctrine of 
Miller and Smith is not even arguable here.  Another problem 
with the cell site simulator is the breadth of the area under 
search.  Allowing a police van to troll the streets of a 
neighborhood or town in order to locate a particular phone 
raises the specter of an illegal general warrant.  Perhaps for 
these reasons it has been DOJ policy since 2016 to seek a Rule 
41 warrant to authorize use of these devices.  Based on such 
legal and practical concerns, law enforcement use of cell site 
simulators will in all likelihood be subject to the Fourth 
Amendment.101 
A similar outlook was embraced by one Florida appellate 
court that extended Carpenter’s warrant requirement to a 
cell-site simulator to suppress evidence gathered by a cell-site 
simulator.102  Unlike the Patrick panel majority, this court saw 
the true nature of cell-site simulators: 
With a cell-site simulator, the government does more than 
obtain data held by a third party.  The government 
surreptitiously intercepts a signal that the user intended to 
send to a carrier’s cell-site tower or independently pings a cell 
phone to determine its location.  Not only that, a cell-site 
simulator also intercepts the data of other cell phones in the 
area, including the phones or people not being investigated.  If a 
warrant is required for the government to obtain historical 
cell-site information voluntarily maintained and in possession of 
a third party, we can discern no reason why a warrant would 
not be required for the more invasive use of a cell-site 
simulator.103 
Therefore, based on this analysis, one can reasonably 
anticipate that the Court would require the government to get a 
warrant before using a Stingray.  Such a ruling would be a 
 
100 THE CATO INSTITUTE, STINGRAY: A NEW FRONTIER IN POLICE SURVEILLANCE 
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-809-revised.pdf. 
101 Susan Freiwald & Stephen W. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A 
Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 229 (2018) (emphasis added). 
102 State v. Sylvestre, 254 So. 3d 986, 991–92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).  
103 Id. at 991 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
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natural extension of Carpenter.  More importantly, the decision 
would be congruent with the original purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
C. Towards Mass Incarceration: Syncing Digital Surveillance 
Technology with the War on Drugs 
For the most part, legal scholars have analyzed the Court’s 
surveillance cases solely for their legal precedent and analytical 
framework about the government’s use of high-tech tools.  Few 
discuss them in a focused narrative about the use of unfettered 
discretion by law enforcement in the urban “War on Drugs.”  
Upon a closer examination, the associated themes of narcotics, 
gangs, and race are at the forefront.  First, Kyllo involved the 
police using an infrared thermal imaging device to scan a 
suspect’s home from a city street.104  The scanning revealed that 
the roof over Kyllo’s garage was unusually hot—indicating to the 
government that the suspect was growing marijuana under heat 
lamps in the garage attic.105  Second, the respondent in Jones was 
the owner and operator of a nightclub, who came under suspicion 
of trafficking drugs and became the target of a federal and local 
investigation.106  Jones was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 
and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of 
cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine base.107    
Third, in the consolidated cases of Riley, Riley was stopped 
by police officers for a routine traffic stop and subsequently 
arrested after his car was impounded and firearms found.108  The 
officers accessed information from his smart phone showing that 
Riley was a member of a street gang.109  In its companion case, 
Wurie was arrested for selling drugs after officers opened his 
phone and accessed its call log, tracing the number to his 
suspected apartment building.110  Fourth, bands of robbers in 
Carpenter held up nine Radio Shack and T-Mobile cell phone  
 
 
 
 
104 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001).  
105 Id. 
106 United States v. Jones, 566 U.S. 400, 402 (2012). 
107 Id. at 403–04. 
108 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378 (2014).  
109 Id. at 378–79.  
110 Id. at 373.  
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stores, and Carpenter was apprehended after one of the suspects 
gave police the names and cell phone numbers of his fifteen 
accomplices.111   
The defendants in those cases were fortunate to be 
vindicated at the Supreme Court.  But the vast majority of cases 
in the mass incarceration pipeline never get that far.  Starkly, 
the war on drugs fueled the incarceration boom that has 
culminated in approximately 2.3 million people confined in 
federal and state prisons and local jails.112  According to the New 
York Times, “[i]n 2010, more than 7 in 100 black men ages 30 to 
34 years old were behind bars.  The federal system alone holds 
219,000 inmates, 40 percent above its capacity . . . .”113  Crack 
cocaine violations are the most notorious enhanced penalty.  
Michelle Alexander characterizes mass incarceration as a new 
racial caste system and argues that addressing the disparity of 
racial bias in crack sentencing “is just the tip of the iceberg” 
because the caste system depends on the prison label affixed to 
felons, not the time they served in prison.114  The felon label 
precludes a felon from employment and access to housing, as well 
as enjoying the privileges of citizens, such as voting and jury 
service.115  “Those labeled felons will continue to cycle in and out 
of prison, subject to perpetual surveillance by the police, and 
unable to integrate into the mainstream society and economy.”116  
Clearly these are the effects of mass incarceration.   
III. RACE AND POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY IN A SURVEILLANCE 
STATE 
This section explores why better police accountability is 
needed in a modern world that tries to balance the interests of 
citizens wanting safe neighborhoods with the interest of the 
police conducting investigations.  It combines the analytical 
 
111 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018). 
112 See KARA GOTSCH, BREAKTHROUGH IN U.S. DRUG SENTENCING REFORM: THE 
FAIR SENTENCING ACT AND THE UNFINISHED REFORM AGENDA 1 (2011), 
https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/2011/FSA/WO
LA_RPT_FSA-Eng_FNL-WEB.pdf.  
113 Editorial, Smarter Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.ny 
times.com/2013/08/14/opinion/smarter-sentencing.html. 
114 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 139 (2010); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social 
and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 1271, 1304 (2004). 
115 ALEXANDER, supra note 114, at 191–94. 
116 Id. at 95–96. 
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framework offered by Age of Surveillance and Unwarranted: 
twenty-first century government surveillance involves technology 
and a dramatic increase in “stop and frisks” in urban areas, with 
aspects of critical race theory to better understand the gateway 
to mass incarceration. 
A. Terry and Racial Profiling on the Streets 
Every public defender grimaces at how, under Terry v. Ohio, 
police officers may stop and search and conduct routine searches 
and seizures under the guise of “reasonableness.”117  Officers 
need only point to some objective facts or observations that are 
sufficient to show reasonable suspicion under the circumstances; 
afterwards, courts then assess the reasonableness of searches 
and seizures from this objective point of view.118  Terry was a 
landmark decision protecting defendants’ rights, but, in the 
intervening fifty years, it has become increasingly unclear when 
stops are permissible. 
Today, officers have broad and completely unfettered 
discretion to conduct searches and seizures, since the 
requirement to demonstrate reasonable suspicion of criminal 
wrongdoing has been diluted very much since Terry.  The police 
can justify a decision to stop and frisk regardless of their true 
motivation, and courts tend to give them the benefit of the 
doubt.119  In addition, the many Fourth Amendment exceptions 
the Court has carved out—such as those involving automobile 
stops, immigration laws, administrative searches, collecting and 
searching computer data, and DNA testing—have essentially 
neutralized the Fourth Amendment.120  
At bottom, Terry has been frequently used to support the use 
of proactive stop and frisks by police with near impunity.121  
Friedman describes the dilemma: (1) A person has no recourse if 
they are not arrested, and (2) if a person is arrested and charged, 
that person’s suppression motion will likely be denied given the 
great deference paid to an officer’s justification for the stopping 
 
117 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). 
118 See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 198 (8th ed. 2007) (explaining “[t]he [Terry] 
Court not only permitted stops and frisks on less than probable cause . . . it also 
explicitly invoked the reasonableness clause over the warrant clause as the 
governing standard”). 
119 GRAY, supra note 3, at 279. 
120 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 167–68. 
121 See id.; GRAY, supra note 3, at 279.  
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and frisking, along with the officer’s explanation for what 
constituted articulable suspicion for the stop.122  As such, Gray 
cautions that “leaving the power to conduct stops and frisks to 
the unfettered discretion of law enforcement would threaten the 
right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”123  Indeed, “policing methods like stop and frisk 
have grown out of control, subjecting hundreds of thousands of 
innocent citizens to routine searches and seizures.”124 
Any meaningful discussion of Terry and modern search and 
seizure law must consider the intractability of race and the 
Fourth Amendment.  The connection between the historical 
racial discrimination in American law enforcement and modern 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is strong.  Carol Steiker 
asserts the Framers did not foresee how industrialization would 
spike racial animosity between black and white communities.125  
Nor did they predict the evolution of racially divisive modern law 
enforcement practices, and the Court’s attendant shift to 
probable cause and the exclusionary rule.126 
Surely police, emboldened by a lax Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence favoring them, are disproportionately stopping 
persons of color more than white people.127  This practice is the 
outgrowth from aggressive policing rooted in the forty-year war 
on drugs that began with Richard Nixon’s 1971 professed 
offensive against hard drugs, which continued through the 1980s 
crack cocaine epidemic.128  Alexander argues: 
The extraordinary racial disparities in our criminal-justice 
system would not exist today but for the complicity of the 
United States Supreme Court.  In the failed war on drugs, our 
 
122 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 154–56. 
123 GRAY, supra note 3, at 279; see Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: 
Police Terror of Minority Communities, 12 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. LAW 57, 57 (2014) 
(“Stop and frisk is, in the United States, a central site of inequality, discrimination, 
and abuse of power.”). 
124 GRAY, supra note 3, at 279. 
125 Carol Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
820, 839 (1994).  
126 Id. at 844–45. 
127 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 61–62.  
128 See JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
BLACK AMERICA 20 (2017) (explaining that the drug war began with Richard Nixon’s 
1971 declaration of implementing “a new, all-out offensive” against hard drugs); 
Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, War on Drugs, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 
(Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/topic/war-on-drugs (summarizing how the 
federal government escalated the war on drugs during the crack cocaine epidemic of 
the 1980s).  
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Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches 
and seizures have been eviscerated.  Stop-and-frisk operations 
in poor communities of color are now routine; the arbitrary and 
discriminatory police practices the framers aimed to prevent are 
now commonplace.129 
Set in this socio-historical-political context, Friedman’s 
chapter “Discriminatory Searches” is especially engaging and 
covers the controversy over the racial profiling of racial 
minorities by law enforcement.130  Dubiously, courts have allowed 
racial profiling as long as race is not the only factor for the 
profiling.131  Consequently, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause is effectively overridden in Fourth Amendment 
cases.  Racial profiling is a byproduct of unconscious racial bias, 
which is to blame for the pervasiveness of racial profiling, more 
so than general intentional racism.132  But racial profiling is 
ineffective as a policy because studies show that racial minorities 
do not use or possess drugs more than white people do.133   
Gray also addresses racial profiling.  The thrust is felt in 
Gray’s argument that stop and frisk programs are ineffective and 
disproportionately target politically and economically vulnerable 
communities of color facing routine threats of being stopped and 
frisked.  “This is a circumstance wholly contrary to the 
imperative command at the heart of the Fourth Amendment that 
the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated.”134  Even if aggressive 
stop and frisk programs were effective, they thwart the Fourth 
Amendment’s goal of limiting government authority to conduct 
searches and seizures.135  Aware of such concerns, Christopher 
Slobogin, in a complimentary analysis, proposes a return to 
Terry’s conceptual framework that is consistently and seriously 
 
129 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 6, 2010), 
https://prospect.org/article/new-jim-crow-0; see also Paul Butler, The System is 
Working the Way it is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. 
L.J. 1419, 1428–36 (2016) (describing the racial injustices articulated by the 
Movement for Black Lives); Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A 
Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1485–508 (2016) 
(listing factors which render African Americans vulnerable to repeated police 
interactions, including policing practices, mass criminalization, racial stereotyping, 
and racial segregation). 
130 FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 185. 
131 Id. at 198. 
132 See id. at 197. 
133 Id. at 197 (citing to different studies conducted).  
134 GRAY, supra note 3, at 276.  
135 Id. at 278.  
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enforced by courts with regards to all searches and seizures.136  
The Court could lead the way by developing a multitiered 
justification hierarchy with probable cause at the top, reasonable 
suspicion in the middle, and relevance resting at the bottom.137 
To be sure, moving beyond the limiting 
totality-of-the-circumstances standard surrounding a police 
encounter will allow a deeper understanding of racial profiling.  
As a starting point, application of critical race theory to Fourth 
Amendment cases and issues brings race to the surface, offering 
insights about the power dynamics, attitudes, and behaviors 
between the officer and the person confronted.  Devon Carbado 
and Daria Roithmayr heighten this analysis even further by 
suggesting critical race theory can be applied along with social 
science to show how African Americans are racialized as 
criminals through media representation and popular discourse.138  
Moreover, they question whether color-blind laws and social 
policy purporting to be race neutral actually undermine the 
interests of racial minorities.139  Such an approach considers the 
realities of street policing.140   
On this theme, critical race theorist Paul Butler describes 
how police actually patrol poor black neighborhoods with 
“violence” in the form of beating, killing, pepper spraying, 
stopping and frisking, and handcuffing African American men.141  
 
136 Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the 
Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1054–55 (1998). 
137 See id. at 1053, 1081–85 (proposing a hierarchy of searches and seizures to be 
used based on the proportionality principle). 
138 See Devon W. Carbodo & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social 
Science, 10 ANNU. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149, 151 (2014). 
139 Id. These theories can be grounded by practical applications. For example, in 
addressing systematic racial biases, the late San Francisco Public Defender Jeff 
Adachi offered a blueprint for racial justice calling for the formation of in-house 
racial justice communities, regional racial justice groups, implicit or unconscious 
bias training, and community bridge building. See generally Jeff Adachi et al., A 
Proposal to Achieve Racial Justice Through Enhancing the Work of Public Defense 
Organizations Throughout the Country, BLUEPRINT FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, 
https://sflawlibrary.org/sites/default/files/Racial%20Justice%20Blueprint_1.pdf. 
Such efforts would address the overrepresentation of racial minorities in San 
Francisco’s criminal justice system by raising racial justice issues in jury selection 
and voir dire, bail charging, selective prosecution, racial profiling, and  
sentencing. Id.  
140 See Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounter”—Some Preliminary Thoughts 
About Fourth Amendment Seizure: Should Race Matter? 26 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 
243, 248, 250, 252, 253 (1991).  
141 See generally PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN  
82–116 (2017). 
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These examples of police misconduct were neatly encapsulated 
for mainstream America through media accounts of the violent 
killings of young African American men following the 2012 
shooting of African American seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin 
in Miami Gardens, Florida and the 2014 shooting of 
eighteen-year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.142  In 
the following years, there was a slew of tragic deaths of young 
black men and women at the hands of white police officers, 
accompanied by the Black Lives Matter demonstrations 
clamoring for police accountability.143  Concerning this, Butler 
theorizes that police routinely harass and discriminate against 
African Americans so they can be placed under government 
surveillance.144  He states, “[S]top-and-frisk does not make 
communities safer.  Instead it causes many men of color to hate 
the police, and makes them less willing to engage with the 
government in any way . . . .”145 
To supplement their academic discourse, Butler, Gray, and 
Friedman separately analyze the New York City Police 
Department’s (“NYPD”) use of stop and frisks, which was found 
to be unconstitutional by Judge Shira Scheindlin in 2013.146  The 
NYPD made 4.4 million stops between January 2004 and June 
2012.147  As distilled from Judge Scheindlin’s robust opinion, over 
eighty percent of those stopped were African American or 
Hispanic, and only ten percent of those stopped were white.148  
An equally damning statistic: fifty-two percent of the stops 
included a protective frisk for weapons, and only 1.5% of the 
frisks revealed a weapon.149  African Americans and Hispanics 
were also more likely than whites to be subjected to the use of 
force.150  Based on these findings, Judge Scheindlin concluded 
 
142 See id. at 61; ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: 
SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 21–24 (2017); see 
also CNN, Trayvon Martin Shooting Fast Facts, CNN (last updated Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/us/trayvon-martin-shooting-fast-facts/index.html. 
143 See BUTLER, supra note 141, at 61; FERGUSON, supra note 142. Those killed 
included Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Freddie Gray, Laquan McDonald, Rekia Boyd, 
Remnisha McBride, and Walter Scott. See JEFF CHANG, WE GON’ BE ALRIGHT: 
NOTES ON RACE AND RESEGREGATION 127 (2016). 
144 BUTLER, supra note 141, at 4, 8. 
145 Id. at 96. 
146 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
147 Id. at 556. 
148 Id. at 556, 574. 
149 Id. at 558. 
150 Id. at 559. 
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that the NYPD’s widespread practices of heightening police 
enforcement on members of a racially defined group was 
unconstitutional.151  Disappointingly, while there have been 
fewer stops since the court’s decision, both the racial profiling of 
African Americans and Hispanic and the aggressive policing of 
minority communities continues.152 
Notably, an especially illuminating aspect of Judge 
Scheindlin’s decision was her discussion of the influence of 
unconscious racial bias, an issue not often mentioned in court 
opinions:  “It would not be surprising if many police officers share 
the latent biases that pervade our society.  If so, such biases 
could provide a further source of unreliability in officers’ rapid, 
intuitive impressions of whether an individual’s movements are 
furtive and indicate criminality.”153  Gray echoes that implicit 
bias played a major role in the NYPD’s stop and frisk program—
a program that provides “a snapshot of stop and frisk policies and 
practices across the country . . . .”154  He reasons, “[I]mplicit bias 
probably accounts for much of the racial disparity in stop and 
frisk programs.  As products of our society, officers just naturally 
look more closely at Black and Latinos citizens and are far more 
likely to attribute nefarious motives to them and their actions.”155 
B. Digital Surveillance Technology Policing 3.0 in a 
Post-September 11th World  
The war on drugs got a shot in the arm with the “War on 
Terror.”  After the September 11th attacks on America, federal 
and local agencies began to work collaboratively under the 
auspices of fighting the war on terror.  Soon after, the Bush 
Administration implemented policies allowing governmental 
agents to execute arbitrary searches of laptops, cameras, cell 
 
151 Id. at 562–63. 
152 See Jenn Rolnick Borchetta et al., Opinion, Don’t Let the Police Wreck Stop-
and-Frisk Reforms, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/ 
10/opinion/police-stop-and-frisk-reforms.html (analyzing the court ordered reform 
process for the NYPD to improve police discipline and supervision, and criticizing 
potential opposition by police needed reforms while advocating three reforms: 
(1) serious penalties for police misconduct; (2) issue of department smart phones for 
accurate note-keeping; and (3) the creation of a citywide community oversight 
board). 
153 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 580–81. 
154 GRAY, supra note 3, at 53. 
155 Id. at 54. 
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phones, or other electronic devices at this nation’s borders.156  
The umbrella of “national security” allows the government to 
obtain information about terror suspects from internet providers, 
phone companies, banks, and credit reporting agencies without 
any warrant.157  Some of this aggressive policing, which 
Friedman calls “policing without permission,” is misguided 
because it is executed largely in secret without oversight.158  
These tools and strategies used by the government threaten the 
Fourth Amendment’s safeguards.159  As a rejoinder, Friedman 
wants oversight over police conducting warrantless searches and 
discriminatory searches and proposes democratic policing of cops, 
which requires legislators, the police, and courts working 
together in collaborative reform efforts.160   
Age of Surveillance and Unwarranted significantly overlap 
most in their exploration of how racial discriminatory policies are 
accomplished with technology.  At a broad level, police 
departments across the country increasingly rely on predictive 
policing, a method of crime-mapping in which data about 
geographic areas is used to try to anticipate where crimes will 
happen.161  Policing and investigations have been assisted by new 
data technologies, algorithms, digitized facial recognition 
technologies, social media scraping, data mining, person-based 
and place-based predictive analytics, and reliance on big data.162  
Big data is used to identify “predictive risk factors that correlate 
with criminal activity.”163  
 
156 See Daniel Victor, Forced Searches of Phones and Laptops at U.S. Border are 
Illegal, Lawsuit Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
09/13/technology/aclu-border-patrol-lawsuit.html (indicating that the policy began 
under the Bush Administration).  
157 FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 292–96; see also Charlie Savage, Congress 
Approves Six-Year Extension of Surveillance Law, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/us/politics/surveillance-congress-snowden-
privacy.html (reporting that the Senate voted to extend the National Security 
Agency’s surveillance program allowing the warrantless collection of emails, texts, 
phone calls, and private messages from American companies, including AT&T  
and Google). 
158 FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 16–17, 20.  
159 See id. at 287.  
160 See id. at 316–22. 
161 See GRAY, supra note 3, at 38, 40, 264. 
162 See FERGUSON, supra note 142, at 2, 4; see also Taslitz, supra note 88, at 125 
(describing use of facial recognition technology by Florida police to survey a 
downtown nightlife district). 
163 FERGUSON, supra note 142, at 167. 
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This is how race comes into play.  Predictive analytics, social 
network theory, and data-mining technology appear race-neutral 
on the surface, but can be based on factors that correlate with 
race and class.164  More narrowly, data-driven policing means 
aggressive police presence and surveillance, which manifests into 
harassment against African Americans, immigrants, religious 
groups, the poor, and protesters.165  Residents in high crime areas 
who have frequent contact with police may be increasingly linked 
to others in the same situation, potentially leading to an endless 
loop of systematic bias by police associating individuals with 
their neighborhoods, family, or friends.166  In the aggregate, this 
reveals the explicit and implicit bias of big data that is consistent 
with the racial history and systematic inequalities of American 
policing.167  
Consider the ShotSpotter, a digital policing tool that is 
planted in high crime areas through strategically placed, 
networked, powerful acoustic sensors connected to GPS.168  A 
ShotSpotter automatically identifies the sounds of gunshots to 
pinpoint an exact location and alert police to potential violent 
crime before it is reported by human witnesses; such devices 
have been deployed in high crime areas in Washington, D.C., 
Boston, Oakland, San Fransisco, San Antonio, and 
Minneapolis.169  ShotSpotter sensors can also pick up outside 
conversations, sounds, and other audio without the consent and 
knowledge of individuals, which could be used in the 
prosecution’s case.170  Just like Stingrays, Shotspotters are a new 
technology that assists the government in sustaining the mass 
incarceration machinery.   
 
164 See id. at 103–04; see also Michelle Alexander, The Newest Jim Crow, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/opinion/sunday/criminal-
justice-reforms-race-technology.html. 
165 See FERGUSON, supra note 142, at 5. 
166 Id. at 56–57. 
167 Id. at 131–32. 
168 See SHOTSPOTTER, https://www.shotspotter.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2019). 
169 Id.; see also Dean Weingarten, San Antonio Pulls the Plug on ShotSpotter 
Gunfire Detection System, Hartford, CT Next?, THE TRUTH ABOUT GUNS (Aug. 21, 
2017), http://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/2017/08/dean-weingarten/san-antonio-
pulss-the-plug-on-shotspotter-gunfire-detection-system-hartford-ct-next/. 
170 See Suraj K. Sazawal, Is ShotSpotter Violating Your Fourth Amendment 
Rights And You Don’t Even Know?, RIGHTS AND DISSENT (May 8, 2015), 
https://www.rightsanddissent.org/news/is-shotspotter-violating-your-fourth-
amendment-rights-and-you-dont-even-know/. 
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IV. UTAH V. STRIEFF: ASSAULTING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND 
ENABLING STINGRAY SURVEILLANCE  
This section takes a procedural turn.  As the Court pushes 
back against police encroachment on the constitutional rights of 
defendants in substantive Fourth Amendment surveillance cases, 
the Court is also simultaneously whittling away at the Fourth 
Amendment in its procedural rulings.  For example, the police 
can stop any individual they want based on the suspicion that a 
crime is or was being committed.  The Court’s far-reaching ruling 
in Utah v. Strieff took a slice off of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule by allowing police officers to stop and question 
citizens based on a hunch or whim that a criminal violation has 
occurred.171   
In Strieff, the Court ruled five to three in favor of the State 
of Utah and held that contraband obtained over the course of an 
illegal search did not violate Strieff’s Fourth Amendment rights 
and as a result was not subject to suppression under the 
exclusionary rule.172  A Utah narcotics detective engaged in a 
weeklong “intermittent” surveillance of a house based on an 
anonymous tip left on a drug tip line about “narcotics activity” at 
that specific house.173  He observed a number of people making 
brief visits to the residence over the course of a week that made 
him suspicious that the occupants were dealing drugs.174  Driving 
an unmarked car, the detective followed Strieff from the 
residence to a nearby lot and detained him, asking him what he 
was doing at the house.175  After checking Strieff’s identification 
through the police dispatcher, the detective learned of Strieff’s 
 
171 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016); id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). The exclusionary rule applies when there is a substantial causal 
connection between the illegal activity and the evidence offered at trial. See 
SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 118, at 529. The Court has repeatedly declined to 
extend the exclusionary rule. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009) 
(holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply when an isolated incident of police 
negligence leads to an unlawful search); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 586, 599 
(2006) (declining to apply exclusionary rule to a knock-and-announce violation); see 
also David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The 
Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment in the Fourth, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 283, 301 (2006) (criticizing the Court for “completely recast[ing] the 
exclusionary rule as a narrow remedy that applies only when the evidence seized is 
of the type that the constitutional protection was designed to protect”). 
172 136 S. Ct. at 2064.  
173 Id. at 2059–60.  
174 Id. at 2057. 
175 Id.; State v. Strieff, 286 P.3d 317, 320 (Utah Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 357 P.3d 
532 (Utah 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
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outstanding arrest warrant for an unpaid traffic ticket.176  A 
baggie of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were found 
on Strieff during a search incident to arrest, and he was 
subsequently charged with unlawful possession of 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.177 
At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor responded to 
Strieff’s claim that it was an unlawful investigatory stop, 
conceding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for 
stopping Strieff because the detective never saw Strieff enter the 
suspected drug house or knew how long Strieff was there.178  The 
State argued however, that even though there was no reasonable 
suspicion for the stop, the valid arrest warrant attenuated the 
connection between the unlawful stop and the discovery of the 
contraband.179 
The issue presented to the Court was whether the 
attenuation doctrine applies where an unconstitutional detention 
leads to the discovery of a valid arrest warrant.180  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Thomas applied the Brown v. Illinois181 
three-factor test to determine if the exclusionary rule applied 
based on a substantial causal connection between the illegal 
activity and the evidence offered at trial or whether the evidence 
was sufficiently attenuated from the original warrant.182  He 
concluded that: (1) “temporal proximity” between the initial 
unlawful stop and the search favors suppressing the evidence 
because the drugs were found on Strieff minutes after the stop; 
(2) the “presence of intervening circumstances” strongly favors 
the state because the valid warrant authorizing Strieff’s arrest 
existed before his stop and was unrelated to the investigation of 
the suspected drug house; and (3) there was no misconduct 
because the officer only acted negligently, which did not rise to a 
“purposeful or flagrant” violation of Strieff’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.183  As Justice Thomas reasoned, “[T]here is no indication 
that this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent 
 
176 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2060; State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015), 
rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).  
177 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2060. 
178 State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536–37 (Utah 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2056 
(2016). 
179 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2060. 
180 Id. 
181 422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
182 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061–62. 
183 Id. at 2062–63. 
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police misconduct . . . all the evidence suggests that the stop was 
an isolated instance of negligence that occurred in connection 
with a bonafide investigation of a suspected drug house.”184 
Perhaps to the chagrin of Justice Thomas, there is an 
alternative interpretation of the facts to support the conclusion 
that this was not a so-called “isolated instance of negligence.”  
The remainder of this section offers a close reading of the 
majority opinion, reveals its flaws, and concludes that Strieff 
establishes a bad precedent that further empowers the great 
unfettered discretion officers already have.  First, the centerpiece 
of the opinion’s infirmities is Justice Thomas’s misreading of 
Brown, a case wherein the suspect made two inculpatory 
statements after being arrested without probable cause and 
being given Miranda warnings twice.185  At issue was whether a 
Miranda warning sufficiently breaks the causal chain between 
an illegal arrest and a confession.186  The Brown Court held that 
there was no break because Miranda warnings, per se, cannot 
make the act of confession a product of free will sufficient enough 
to break the causal connection between the confession and the 
illegal arrest.187  In comparison, there was no significant 
intervening event analyzed in Strieff.  Attenuation from the 
discovery of the contraband came by the detective’s exploitation 
of his own illegal conduct.188 
Second, Justice Thomas erroneously construed the officer’s 
conduct as not being “purposeful and flagrant” but as an “isolated 
instance of negligence.”189  To the contrary, the detective 
committed to a surveillance spanning a week, based not on a 
reliable informant’s tip, but rather on an isolated anonymous tip 
left on a caller hotline.190  As such, the stopping of Strieff was as 
purposeful as the actions of the Chicago police officers who broke 
into petitioner’s apartment in Brown.  There, the officers 
searched Brown’s apartment and arrested him without probable 
cause or a warrant, in order to question him in an ongoing 
murder investigation.191  As Justice Blackmun, writing for the 
 
184 Id. at 2063. 
185 See Brown, 422 U.S. at 594–96.  
186 Id. at 597. 
187 Id. at 603–04. 
188 See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064–65 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing how 
“[i]n his search for lawbreaking, the officer in this case himself broke the law”). 
189 Id. at 2063–64.  
190 Id. at 2059–60. 
191 See Brown, 422 U.S. at 592. 
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majority in Brown, pointed out, “the illegality here . . . had a 
quality of purposefulness.  The impropriety of the arrest was 
obvious; awareness of that fact was virtually conceded by the two 
detectives . . . .  The arrest, both in design and execution, was 
investigatory.”192  Similarly, the same could be said of the 
detective’s stopping of Strieff without reasonable suspicion; it 
was a stop simply made for the purpose of embarking on a fishing 
expedition, hoping to reel something in.   
A fuller understanding is presented by Justice Sotomayor’s 
dissent where she applied the same Brown factors to obtain an 
opposite result: the officer illegally stopped Strieff and discovered 
the drugs by “exploiting his own illegal conduct.”193  As to the 
first Brown factor, Justice Sotomayor astutely recognized that 
there was no time lapse since the officer performed a warrant 
check immediately after stopping Strieff.194  Furthermore, there 
was no intervening circumstance because Salt Lake County’s 
enormous backlog of outstanding warrants was well known to 
officers, and thus “the officer’s discovery of a warrant was not 
some intervening surprise that he could not have anticipated.”195   
Next, Justice Thomas misinterpreted Segura v. United 
States196 and again, erroneously relied on an inapposite case to 
support a contrary conclusion.  Justice Kagan acknowledges as 
much in a footnote in her dissent in Strieff: 
[In Segura], [t]he Court . . . held that the Fourth Amendment 
violation at issue “did not contribute in any way” to the police’s 
subsequent procurement of a warrant and discovery of  
 
 
192 Id. at 605. 
193 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2066–67 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
194 Id. at 2066. 
195 Id. at 2067. Orin Kerr also critiques the majority’s use of the Brown factors. 
See Orin Kerr, Opinion Analysis: The Exclusionary Rule is Weakened But It Still 
Lives, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2016, 9:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/ 
06/opinion-analysis-the-exclusionary-rule-is-weakened-but-it-still-lives/. The Brown 
three-factor test, as used by Justice Thomas, is not a well settled doctrine as the 
majority portrays it to be. Id. Kerr theorizes that the Court in Brown did not apply a 
strict three factor test, but rather a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Id. 
Moreover, he believes that an “intervening circumstance” should be considered “an 
outside event that changes what is expected to happen.” Id. Thus, in Strieff, there 
was no intervening circumstance because the police stop went according to plan; an 
officer conducting a warrant check could expect a warrant to appear. Indeed, the 
“existence of the warrant is only an intervening circumstance if you didn’t expect 
Strieff to have a warrant out for his arrest.” Id. Finally, under the third Brown 
factor, the burden of proof in establishing attenuation is on the government. Id. 
196 468 U.S. 796 (1984). 
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contraband.  So the Court had no occasion to consider the 
question here: What happens when an unconstitutional act in 
fact leads to a warrant which then leads to evidence?197 
In extrapolating Justice Kagan’s footnote further, Segura 
appears to have relied on the independent source doctrine.  
Specifically, the Court in Segura considered whether to supress 
evidence procured during an illegal search when officers later 
obtained a warrant predicated on probable cause free of the 
information from the intital search.198  New York Drug 
Enforcement Task Force agents relied on a tip and conducted 
weeks-long surveillance over Segura’s apartment.199  They were 
instructed to “secure” the premises to prevent the destruction of 
evidence.200  Alarmingly, law enforcement agents forcibly entered 
Segura’s apartment, without requesting or receiving 
permission.201  In dissent, Justice Stevens referred to the day-
long police occupation of Segura’s apartment and surmised that 
these facts epitomized the deterrence rationale behind the 
exclusionary rule, and thus the evidence obtained should have 
been excluded.202  The Segura Court declined to suppress the 
evidence because “the illegal entry into petitioners’ apartment 
did not contribute in any way to discovery of the evidence seized 
under the warrant.”203 
In contrast, the officer’s illegal conduct in Strieff did actually 
contribute to the discovery of the evidence procured in the 
search.204  Justice Sotomayor explained that the facts of the two 
cases are markedly distinguishable: 
 
 
197 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2073 n.2 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Segura, 468 U.S. 
at 815). 
198 See Segura, 468 U.S. at 797–98.  
199 Id. at 799–800. Bearing this in mind, Professor Joshua Dressler referred to 
Segura decades earlier as a hurried, “inherently flawed,” and “unnecessarily weak” 
decision. See Joshua Dressler, A Lesson in Caution, Overwork, and Fatigue: The 
Judicial Miscraftsmanship of Segura v. United States, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, 
410–11 (1985). According to Dressler, that opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger 
offered reasoning and a conclusion based only on implied legal authority pulled from 
prior Court cases that were factually distinguishable. Id. at 405–07. Dressler asserts 
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[I]t is difficult to understand [the majority’s] interpretation.  In 
Segura, the agents’ illegal conduct in entering the apartment 
had nothing to do with procurement of a search warrant.  Here, 
the officer’s illegal conduct in stopping Strieff was essential to 
his discovery of an arrest warrant.  Segura would be similar 
only if the agents used information they illegally obtained from 
the apartment to procure a search warrant or discover an arrest 
warrant.205 
It is worth noting that Justice Sotomayor is the only Justice 
who mentioned Wong Sun v. United States206—the seminal “fruit 
of a poisonous tree” case—when she explained that the guiding 
principle of Wong Sun applied because that case turned on the 
fact that police officers exploited their initial illegal search to 
obtain tainted evidence.207  According to Justice Sotomayor, 
“Wong Sun explains why Strieff’s drugs must be excluded.  We 
reasoned that a Fourth Amendment violation may not color every 
investigation that follows but it certainly strains the actions of 
officers who exploit the infraction.  We distinguished evidence 
obtained by innocuous means from evidence obtained by 
exploiting misconduct.”208  
Taking Justice Sotomayor’s cue, Wong Sun’s applicability 
does deserve more attention.  Wong Sun’s analysis should have 
been used to resolve the issues in Strieff.  At issue in Wong Sun 
was whether the illegality of the evidence to which an instant 
objection was made came about because of the illegality itself or 
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint.209  The Wong Sun Court held that the narcotics 
clearly came about from the exploitation of illegality, and thus 
the statement made from an unlawful  arrest may not be used.210   
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There are striking similarities between Wong Sun and 
Strieff.  The officers in Wong Sun wanted to make drug busts 
without having to secure proper search warrants.  They were 
aware of what they were doing and acted intentionally in 
searching the laundromat and residences.  Their misconduct was 
punished in the case because the evidence was excluded against 
one of Wong Sun’s co-defendants.211  With that in mind, Strieff’s 
exploitation was more like that in Wong Sun than that in Segura 
because the officer in Strieff wanted to make a drug bust without 
a warrant and intentionally stopped Strieff in the hopes that he 
possessed contraband and had an outstanding warrant for his 
arrest.  The officers however were not punished for this 
misconduct, and the evidence was admitted into evidence just 
because of the active warrant.   
Yet incredibly, Justice Thomas disregards these key 
differences and states that “the Court addressed similar facts to 
those here and found sufficient intervening circumstances to 
allow the admission of evidence.”212  Justice Thomas surmised 
that the agents in Segura had probable cause to believe there 
was drug dealing in the apartment and sought a warrant which 
was not issued until the next day.213  With the warrant pending, 
the agents entered the apartment, arrested an occupant, and 
then discovered evidence of drug activity.214  Based on this shaky 
premise, Justice Thomas asserted that Segura’s principles apply 
in Strieff because in both cases, the connection between the 
unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence was “sufficiently 
attenuated to dissipate the taint.”215 
Third, Strieff ignores the primary purpose of the 
exclusionary rule: the deterrence of unlawful police misconduct.  
Facing this contradictory evidence, how could the majority find 
that the officer acted in good faith? 216  Justice Kagan emphasized 
this irreconcilable fact in her conclusion: 
The majority chalks up Fackrell’s Fourth Amendment violation 
to a couple of innocent “mistakes.” But far from a Barney Fife-
type mishap, Fackrell’s seizure of Strieff was a calculated 
decision, taken with so little justification that the State has 
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never tried to defend its legality.  At the suppression hearing, 
Fackrell acknowledged that the stop was designed for 
investigatory purposes—i.e., to “find out what was going on [in] 
the house” he had been watching, and to figure out “what 
[Strieff] was doing there.”217   
The majority’s good faith contention is further skewered in 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, where she responded to the core 
deficiencies in the Court’s analysis:  “The officer found the drugs 
only after learning of Strieff’s traffic violation; and he learned of 
Strieff’s traffic violation only because he unlawfully stopped 
Strieff to check his driver’s license.” 218 
Strieff allows officers to retroactively claim grounds for 
making an unconstitutional stop and circumvent the 
exclusionary rule.  In essence, Strieff allows police officers to stop 
people to check for warrants, regardless of any belief of 
wrongdoing.219  Stephen Saltzburg contends, “[Strieff’s] practical 
effect might be to greatly enhance law enforcement incentives to 
make ‘stops’ without the necessary reasonable suspicion and 
might affect a large number of people.” 220  Put simply, if there is 
no warrant, the suspect will be allowed to leave.  If there is a 
warrant, he can be searched incident to arrest and questioned 
further.   
This issue can arise in a Stingray surveillance case.  Patrick, 
discussed earlier in Part II, is a case on point.  There, the 
Seventh Circuit broadly interpreted Strieff as precluding the 
application of the exclusionary rule.221  However, in her dissent, 
Judge Wood argued that the panel majority unnecessarily 
extended Strieff by failing to see that the facts were 
distinguishable; the police got the arrest warrant, used the 
Stingray to locate Patrick, and then found the gun in plain view 
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during the arrest.222  From her point of view, the arrest warrant 
was not an intervening cause and could not have attenuated any 
potential taint.223    
Lastly, while the Strieff majority opinion did not mention it, 
the decision will have far-reaching effects on minority 
communities.  Citing to social science studies outside of the 
record about the influence of race on criminal procedure, 
including Alexander’s work on mass incarceration, Justice 
Sotomayor was the only Justice to acknowledge the racial 
realities of American society.224  She made insightful points about 
the majority opinion, finding that the Strieff ruling “allows the 
police to stop you on the street, demand your identification, and 
check it for outstanding traffic warrants—even if you are not 
doing anything wrong,” 225 enabling officers to arbitrarily target 
citizens and racial minorities who are disproportionately 
impacted.226  As discussed throughout this Review, this is just the 
kind of twenty-first century policing that Gray and Friedman 
vehemently oppose and warn readers about. 
V. GPS MONITORING AND SUPERVISED PROBATION IN 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 
This closing section discusses the unfettered discretion 
exercised by the MPD when embarking on indiscriminate 
searches using Veritrax GPS records to look for potential 
suspects who may be on supervised probation.  This issue has 
received scant attention because the increase in the number of 
people on community supervision, or “mass supervision” through 
probation and parole, is largely not given the attention that it 
deserves.227 
Akin to mass incarceration, supervised release also reflects 
racial inequality:  African Americans make up thirty percent of 
those on probation or parole, most of whom were convicted of 
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drug and property crimes.228  Because they are subject to 
postconviction surveillance and court ordered rules, a third of 
them will likely return to jail or prison for violating a myriad of 
rules, including prohibitions on drug and alcohol use, having 
contact with felons, failing to pay fines and fees, and disobeying 
movement restrictions.229  A person on supervision in 
Washington, D.C. is especially vulnerable to searches, because 
unlike other jurisdictions, Washington, D.C. has no search 
condition statute that puts supervisees on notice, and the only 
warning provided is the ostensibly benign advisal that the 
supervisees’ “movement will be tracked and stored as an official 
record.”230  Plus, GPS monitoring is far more intrusive than a 
search of a person or home because the MPD have real-time, 
direct access to a database with up to twenty years of data.231 
The MPD’s practice of circumventing the Fourth Amendment 
by running random searches of the supervision data, and 
importing specific names of supervisees to lock in their location, 
stands at the new frontier of Fourth Amendment litigation.  The 
Public Defender Service successfully litigated this very issue in 
United States v. Jackson, where the Superior Court of D.C. held 
that the MPD violated Jackson’s Fourth Amendment rights when 
it unlawfully searched Jackson’s GPS location information 
without suspicion and absent any probation violation.232  The 
MPD accessed Jackson’s GPS location information, maintained 
pursuant to a GPS contract executed between Jackson and the 
Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (“CSOSA”), 
during their investigation of an armed robbery by two unknown 
African American men.233  Without specifically identifying 
Jackson, or even having witness accounts of seeing one of the 
men wearing a GPS monitoring device, the MPD looked for 
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anyone wearing a GPS monitor near the crime scene.234  The 
MPD eventually captured GPS records showing all of Jackson’s 
movements over multiple weeks, including movements in 
Jackson’s private home.235  These records were used to track 
down Jackson and another man at their home, which lead to the 
finding of a black ski mask and an SUV that was tied to the 
robbery.236 
At the suppression hearing, the Government argued that 
Jackson consented to be placed on probation, and thus consented 
to the police searching his location data; he had no legitimate 
expectation of privacy.237  The Government also asserted that the 
“special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment allows 
searches conducted without any ground for suspicion of 
particular individuals in certain limited circumstances,238 and 
thus the search was authorized.  Defense counsel argued that the 
search of Jackson’s GPS location information was a “fishing 
expedition” done for law enforcement purposes.239  They stated 
that though Jackson was placed on GPS supervision by CSOSA  
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to track his whereabouts, that fact does not make it less of a 
search, and that search must also be reasonable.240  Defense 
counsel contended that:  
CSOSA completely frustrated the purpose of the Privacy 
Act . . . by granting MPD unfettered access to its GPS database.  
MPD did not follow the Code’s procedure . . . .  Instead, MPD 
ran a general search into a CSOSA’s database, without any 
information as to whether anyone placed on electronic 
monitoring was a suspect of the offense.241 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, Age of Surveillance and Unwarranted are terrific 
books that reveal the lack of clarity in current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence as it relates to emerging technologies.  
The idealistic authors successfully present a prescription on how 
to nurse an ailing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Gray 
argues that the text and history of the Fourth Amendment 
provide effective constitutional remedies and would be effective 
in meeting contemporary threats if they are taken seriously by 
courts and law enforcement agencies.  Along a similar line, 
Friedman contends that the collective dimension of the Fourth 
Amendment should be taken seriously to ensure the collective 
security of the people.  The burden now rests on the people to 
take action.  We must demand more transparency of police 
surveillance and be allowed to participate in the decisionmaking 
process regarding how surveillance technology is used.  We must 
also require more police accountability and better training for 
officers and judges so that they can understand the influence of 
the unconscious biases that we all have.  Unquestionably, these 
goals must be met if we are to protect privacy rights and slow 
down the continual erosion of the Fourth Amendment. 
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